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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE REVISED MODEL
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
In 1950 the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar As-
sociation (the Committee) adopted the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act (Model Act or MBCA).1 The Committee drafted the
*This Special Project Note is cited as "Revised Model Act (Special Project)"
throughout the Special Project.
1. The Model Act originally was published in ABA-ALI MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT
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Model Act in order to provide a dynamic model for keeping state
corporation laws updated and responsive to the current demands
of the business and legal communities.' Because of this goal, the
Model Act was in a constant state of revision. This constant state
of revision provided an impetus for the Committee to adopt, in
1984, the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (Revised Model
Act or Revised MBCA).4 The Committee intended the Revised
Model Act to stand as a convenient guide to state legislatures re-
vising their own corporation statutes.5 This Special Project Note
discusses the Revised Model Act's treatment of directors' and of-
ficers' duty of care and duty of loyalty, and the Revised Model
Act's impact, if any, on this area of the law.
(1950). The Model Act has been adopted in substance in over 35 states.
2. See Mulder, Introduction to ABA-ALI MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT, at iii (1959).
The Model Act began as a federal corporation act in 1940.
3. Amendments to the Model Act are published regularly in the Business Lawyer.
See, e.g., Comm. on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation
Act-Amendments to Financial Provisions, 34 Bus. LAW. 1867 (1979), adopted, 35 Bus.
LAW. 1365 (1980); Comm. on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation
Act Affecting Dissenters' Rights, 32 Bus. LAW. 1855 (1977), adopted, 33 Bus. LAW. 2587
(1978).
4. The official text of the Revised Model Act appears in REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT (1985) [hereinafter REVISED MBCA or Revised Model Act] and in MODEL Busi-
NESS CORP. ACT ANN. (3d ed. Supp. 1986). Currently, the Revised Model Act has been
adopted in substance in only two states: Tennessee and Virginia.
The Exposure Draft to the Revised Model Act listed three justifications for the revision:
(1) the need to publish a third edition of the MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN.; (2) the need
to react to state experimentations showing that numerous significant simplifications and
innovations could be made in the Model Act; and (3) the need to consolidate all previous
amendments and to determine the precise content of the Model Act. The Committee, there-
fore, decided to revise the entire Model Act to ensure that there would be internal consis-
tantcy and uniformity. See REVISED MBCA, supra, at xiii-xiv (Exposure Draft 1983).
5. The Revised Model Act attempts to mix the different commercial and social in-
terests surrounding the modern business corporation. See REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, at
xvii. The Revised Model Act was written by corporate lawyers; therefore, the Revised Model
Act's "appropriate mix" of the various interests may lean more toward the interests of cor-
porate management than toward shareholders. See generally Branson, Countertrends in
Corporation Law: Model Business Corporation Act Revision, British Company Law Re-
form, and Principles of Corporate Governance & Structure, 68 MINN. L. REV. 53, 56-72
(1983) (stating that the Model Act, through the use of "flexible statutes," is a pro-manage-
ment Act); Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663, 665 (1974) (arguing that "[b]ecause the Model Act has been endorsed by leaders of the
corporate bar and is itself an American Bar Association committee product, it too acceler-
ated the trend toward [corporate] permissiveness").
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II. THE DUTIES OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
Section 8.01 of the Revised Model Act s establishes the require-
ments and duties for a board of directors. It is essential to define
the duties of a director before attempting to determine if there has
been a breach of these duties.
Section 8.01 establishes a director's duty in accordance with
the realities of today's outside, and possibly inside,8 directors and
their involvement in large, publicly held corporations. Section 8.01
provides that the business and affairs of a corporation will be man-
aged "under the direction of' a board of directors rather than
"by"'1 a board of directors. This formulation of a director's duty
reflects that while in small corporations, and maybe even in some
larger corporations, directors exercise significant control over the
affairs of the corporation, a totally different situation exists in
large, publicly held corporations because directors are not involved
actively in the management of the corporation. Under the Revised
6. Section 8.01 states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c), each corporation must have a board of
directors.
(b) All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the
business and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of
directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation.
(c) A corporation having 50 or fewer shareholders may dispense with or limit the
authority of a board of directors by describing in its articles of incorporation who will
perform some or all of the duties of a board of directors.
REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.01 (emphasis added).
7. Revised Model Act § 8.01(b) tracks the beginning of Model Act § 35, as amended
in 1974, which concerned a director's duties and the applicable standard of care. 2 MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 8.01 (3d ed. Supp. 1986); see MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35
(1978) [hereinafter MBCA or Model Act].
Basic tort law requires that a person's duties be defined before determining whether
that person has negligently breached these duties. See Manning, The Business Judgment
Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAw. 1477, 1493
(1984).
8. Despite the great differences between an inside director's and an outside direc-
tor's potential involvement in the management of a corporation, no distinction is made be-
tween directors in the Revised Model Act.
9. REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.01(b).
10. As originally enacted, the Model Act simply provided that "the business and af-
fairs of a corporation be managed by a board of directors." In 1974 the Model Act was
amended to read "under the direction of a board of directors." See 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
AcT ANN. § 8.01 historical background § 2 (3d ed. Supp. 1986). The annotation specifically
states that the change was made so that § 8.01 would not be "interpreted to mean that
directors must become involved in the detailed administration of the corporation's affairs."
Id. This statutory change was foreshadowed by Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del.
Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963), which noted that the size of modern corporations forces direc-
tors to "confine their control to the broad policy decisions." Id. at 84, 188 A.2d at 130.
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Model Act, therefore, a director's duty is not to provide detailed
administration of the corporation, but is to establish "major man-
agement policy."11 The Revised Model Act recognizes that direc-
tors are not expected to become involved in the day-to-day deci-
sionmaking of a corporation,12 activities more appropriately
delegated to the corporate officers.' 3
While the Revised Model Act reflects the view that directors
are not responsible for the daily operation of a corporation, it, un-
fortunately, does not define clearly the responsibilities of corporate
directors.' 4 The Revised Model Act merely lists a few of the spe-
cific tasks required of directors, such as the adoption of by-laws 5
and the election of officers. 16 This lack of a precise definition has
contributed to the courts' and legislatures' continuing problems in
determining whether directors have fulfilled their duties.17
Because of their lack of time to "call the shots," directors may
delegate authority to the officers of a corporation.'" When directors
exercise this option to delegate, however, they still have a duty of
11. REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.01 official comment at 194-95 (stating that in
large, publicly held corporations "it is not feasible to impose a requirement that the busi-
ness and affairs of the corporation be managed 'by' the board of directors. . . since the role
of the board of directors consists principally of the formulation of major management policy
with little or no direct involvement in day-to-day management").
12. See, e.g., Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (explaining that
directors "are not expected to interfere individually in the actual conduct" of the corpora-
tion's affairs); Lowell Hoit & Co. v. Detig, 320 Ill. App. 179, 181-82, 50 N.E.2d 602, 603
(1943) (stating that directors, by "necessity," must delegate much authority to
subordinates).
13. See Soderquist, Toward a More Effective Corporate Board: Reexamining Roles
of Outside Directors, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1341 (1977); Mace, The President and the Board of
Directors, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1972, at 37 (concluding that the role of the board is
largely advisory and is not of a decisionmaking nature); see also Manning, supra note 7, at
1481 (asserting that the average director devotes only 1.5 working days a month to the
corporation).
14. The Business Roundtable, however, has published its list of "core functions" for a
board of directors. These "core functions" are as follows:
(1) Management, Board Selection, and Succession;
(2) Corporate Actions and Decisions with Potential for Maximum Economic Impact;
(3) Corporate Social Responsibility; and
(4) Compliance with Law.
The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corpora-
tion: Statement of the Business Roundtable, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2096-2103 (1978).
15. See REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 2.06.
16. Id. § 8.40(a).
17. See supra note 7; infra notes 51-98 and accompanying text.
18. See REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.01 official comment at 195 (acknowledging
that "it is generally recognized that the board of directors may delegate to appropriate of-
ficers those powers not required by law to be exercised by the board").
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"oversight"1" concerning the officers' actions. Section 8.25 grants
directors the power to create one or more committees composed of
directors unless the articles of incorporation or by-laws provide
otherwise;20 section 8.25(d) confers upon these committees the
same authority granted the board under section 8.01, subject to the
limitations of section 8.25(e).2 '
Section 8.4122 details the duties of the officers of a corporation.
This section empowers the officers to perform "the duties set forth
in the bylaws, or . . . the duties prescribed by the board of direc-
tors. ' 2 Therefore, section 8.41 establishes the power by which the
directors can delegate to the officers the duty to manage the daily
operations of the corporation.24 In addition to any specific duties
delegated to the officers by the directors,25 the officers also may
have "implied '26 or "apparent"27 authority to act on behalf of the
corporation.
19. See id. (warning that "delegation does not relieve the board of directors from its
responsibilities of oversight").
20. REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.25(a). Section 8.25(a) provides:
Unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise, a board of directors may create
one or more committees and appoint members of the board of directors to serve on
them. Each committee must have two or more members, who serve at the pleasure of
the board of directors.
Id.
21. Id. § 8.25(d).
22. Section 8.41 provides:
Each officer has the authority and shall perform the duties set forth in the bylaws or,
to the extent consistent with the bylaws, the duties prescribed by the board of directors
or by direction of an officer authorized by the board of directors to prescribe the duties
of other officers.
Id. § 8.41.
23. Id.
24. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
25. Interestingly, the Revised Model Act lists no specific duties for the president,
treasurer, or any other officer of a corporation. All of an officer's power, therefore, is derived
from the by-laws, from the directors, or from implied or apparent authority.
26. Officers may have implied authority by virtue of the position they hold in the
corporation. For example, the mere fact that the directors appointed a president implies
that this individual has sufficient authority to make ordinary business transactions for the
corporation. See REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.41 official comment at 236; see also
Yucca Mining & Petroleum Co. v. Howard C. Phillips Oil Co., 69 N.M. 281, 365 P.2d 925
(1961) (holding that a corporation is bound by contracts entered into by the president on
behalf of the corporation).
27. Apparent authority results when a corporation holds out to third persons that an
officer has sufficient power to bind the corporation and third persons reasonably rely on this
representation. See REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.41 official comment at 236; see also
Juergens v. Venture Capital Corp., 1 Mass. App. Ct. 274, 295 N.E.2d 398 (1973) (finding
apparent authority when the president was vested with extensive corporate authority and
exercised great power).
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III. THE DUTY OF CARE
A. Introduction
Section 8.3028 outlines the Revised Model Act's formulation
for a director's 29 standard of conduct or "duty of care." This sec-
28. Section 8.30 provides:
(a) A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a
member of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exer-
cise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation.
(b) In discharging his duties a director is entitled to rely on information, opinions,
reports, or statements, including financial statements and other financial data, if pre-
pared or presented by:
(1) one or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the director
reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented;
(2) legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters the direc-
tor reasonably believes are within the person's professional or expert competence;
or
(3) a committee of the board of directors of which he is not a member if the
director reasonably believes the committee merits confidence.
(c) A director is not acting in good faith if he has knowledge concerning the matter
in question that makes reliance otherwise permitted by subsection (b) unwarranted.
(d) A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any failure to take
any action, if he performed the duties of his office in compliance with this section.
REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.30.
29. Part III of this Special Project Note will refer only to a director's duty of care. An
officer's duty of care is covered by REVISED MBCA § 8.42. Section 8.42 is virtually identical
to § 8.30. Section 8.42 states:
(a) An officer with discretionary authority shall discharge his duties under that
authority:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exer-
cise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation.
(b) In discharging his duties an officer is entitled to rely on information, opinions,
reports, or statements, including financial statements and other financial data, if pre-
pared or presented by:
(1) one or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the officer rea-
sonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented; or
(2) legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters the officer
reasonably believes are within the person's professional or expert competence.
(c) An officer is not acting in good faith if he has knowledge concerning the matter
in question that makes reliance otherwise permitted by subsection (b) unwarranted.
(d) An officer is not liable for any action taken as an officer, or any failure to take
any action, if he performed the duties of his office in compliance with this section.
REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.42. The official comment to § 8.42 states that officers
must meet the same standard of conduct as directors. Id. § 8.42 official comment at 237.
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tion draws generally from the common-law formulation for a direc-
tor's duty as gleaned from a number of years of judicial decisions. 30
The common law generally permitted directors to perform their
duties of oversight over the management of a corporation by acting
only if a "red flag"31 of trouble arose.32 In making business deci-
However, because an officer usually is more intricately involved with the management of a
corporation than a director, an officer is less able to rely on the reports of others when
making business decisions and when monitoring the corporation's performance. Id. Other-
wise, the analysis for a director's duty of care generally is applicable to officers. Id.; see
supra An Historical Perspective (Special Project) notes 9-49 and accompanying text; infra
note 57 and accompanying text.
30. The Revised Model Act's formulation for a director's duty of care is substantially
identical to the Model Act's. See REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.30 official comment at
221.
Case law generally makes a distinction between "misfeasance" and "malfeasance." Mis-
feasance concerns a director's duty of oversight when he has delegated authority to the cor-
poration's officers. The landmark case in this area is Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41
Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963). In Allis-Chalmers the Delaware Supreme Court held that
directors are not required to seek out problems with corporate management unless they
have been warned by a "red flag." The court stated:
[D]irectors of a corporation in managing the corporate affairs are bound to use that
amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circum-
stances ....
If [a director] has recklessly reposed confidence in an obviously untrustworthy em-
ployee, has refused or neglected cavalierly to perform his duty as a director, or has
ignored either willfully or through inattention obvious danger signs of employee wrong-
doing, the law will cast the burden of liability upon him.
Allis-Chalmers, 41 Del. Ch. at 84-85, 188 A.2d at 130; see also Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880,
886 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding that liability should only be imposed in the oversight context for
"obvious and prolonged failure to exercise oversight or supervision"), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1051 (1983). See generally Kelly v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62, 72 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff'd, 266 A.2d 878
(Del. 1970).
By contrast, malfeasance occurs during the performance of a director's decisionmaking
function. Case law protects the director in this context if the director acts with the care of
an ordinarily prudent person in a like position under similar circumstances. The business
judgment rule will be applied to analyze the director's decision. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (holding that the business judgment rule protects directors if they
have informed themselves "prior to making a business decision, of all material information
reasonably available to them" and "then act with requisite care in the discharge of their
duties," and also finding that during the decisionmaking process, the business judgment rule
dictates that "director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence"); cf. Smith
v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (stating that the business judgment rule will not
protect directors if there was gross negligence during the decisionmaking process).
For a more complete analysis of the common-law formulation of a director's duty of
care in both contexts, see supra An Historical Perspective (Special Project) notes 9-49 and
accompanying text and supra Recent Developments (Special Project) notes 36-86 and ac-
companying text.
31. The view that directors have an active duty of inquiry in the oversight context
only if there is some specific cause for concern is consistent with the reality that directors
must delegate extensive decisionmaking authority to subordinates. Directors are forced to
delegate because they lack the time and knowledge that is necessary to make the day-to-day
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sions for the corporation, the common law demanded that a direc-
tor's decisionmaking process show due care3 3 and that the actual
substantive decision be supported by some "rational business
purpose." 4
The Revised Model Act's definition of a director's duty of care
is substantially identical to that found in section 35 of the Model
Act," as amended in 1974. The basic standard of conduct required
of a director is set forth in section 8.30(a), which states:
A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a
member of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of
the corporation. 6
One commentator has described this provision as "traditional
and generic. '37 Indeed, the language bears the identifiable features
of the traditional negligence tort doctrine3 and is similar to the
language used in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,3 9 the leading
decisions concerning a corporation. Consequently, directors must rely heavily on subordi-
nates to perform faithfully their duties. Thus, it would be nonsensical to require directors to
do more than react to "red flags." See supra notes 13 & 30; REVISED MBCA, supra note 4,
§ 8.01 official comment at 194-95 (stating that once directors delegate authority to officers,
directors can reasonably rely on the officers and are not personally responsible for the acts
or omissions of the officers).
32. See supra note 30 (discussing "misfeasance").
33. The duty of care requires directors to show diligence during the decisionmaking
process. The decision must be informed and a reasonable amount of time must be devoted
to the decision. See supra An Historical Perspective (Special Project) notes 65-67 and ac-
companying text.
34. If the directors have met their duty of care during the decisionmaking process,
the business judgment rule will protect the actual substantive decision if some "rational
business purpose" supports the decision. For a more thorough discussion of the business
judgment rule and a director's duty of care, see supra An Historical Perspective (Special
Project) notes 50-67 and accompanying text.
35. See supra note 30. The only significant change from the Model Act is in Revised
Model Act § 8.30(b)(3). This section permits directors to rely on a committee if the directors
reasonably believe "the committee merits confidence." In Model Act § 35 this provision was
limited by the phrase "as to matters within [the committee's] designated authority." The
Committee deleted this phrase because it felt a director's reliance should not be limited by
"technical questions as to the scope of the jurisdiction or authority of the committee." 2
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 8.30 annotation at 933 (3d ed. Supp. 1986).
36. REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.30(a).
37. Subak, Takeovers: Where Are We? Where Do We Go?, 41 Bus. LAw. 1255, 1260
(1986). Mr. Subak was chairman of the subcommittee that "revised" § 8.30 in the Revised
Model Act.
38. See Manning, supra ndte 7, at 1478.
39. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). The Delaware Supreme Court stated that "directors of
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case in the area. In addition, while courts and the legal community
in general refer to corporate directors as "fiduciaries,"4 the Re-
vised Model Act omits any reference to the term.4
B. The "Level of Care" Required
Although the term "ordinarily prudent person" in section
8.30(a)(2) would appear to indicate that a director must use ordi-
nary care to avoid liability under the Revised Model Act, little im-
portance should be placed on this formulation of the duty of care
with regard to the level of care it requires. Generally, courts never
place a great deal of significance on specific statutory wording;42
a corporation in managing the corporate affairs are bound to use that amount of care which
ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances." Id. at 130 (em-
phasis added). Two authors have stated that Model Act § 35 and, thus, by inference Revised
Model Act § 8.30, "does no more than codify the existing Delaware standard as expressed by
the court in Graham." Arsht & Hinsey, Codified Standard-Same Harbor But Charted
Channel: A Response, 35 Bus. LAW. ix, xiii (July 1980) (originally printed at page 947 of
volume 35, but later corrected and reprinted at the beginning of issue 4 in volume 35).
Contra Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard-Safe Harbor or Uncharted Reef? An Anal-
ysis of the Model Act Standard of Care Compared with Delaware Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 919
(1980) (arguing that Model Act § 35 departs from the case law of Delaware because the
word "reasonable" causes courts to second-guess the substantive decisions of directors in
direct contradiction to the business judgment rule).
40. See Veasey & Manning, supra note 39, at 925; see also supra An Historical Per-
spective (Special Project) note 4 and accompanying text.
41. The official comments to § 8.30 state that "fiduciary" could be confused with "the
unique attributes and obligations of a fiduciary imposed by the law of trusts, some of which
are not appropriate for directors of a corporation." REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.30
official comment at 222.
Through the years courts have used the term "fiduciary" because the modern day cor-
poration most closely parallels the common-law trust. This characterization, however, can be
misleading. See Nielsen, Directors' Duties under Anglo-American Corporation Law, 43 U.
DET. LJ. 605, 608 (1966). While the "beneficiaries" in both a trust and a corporation are
entitled to undivided trust and loyalty, a shareholder accepts more risk-taking by a director
than a beneficiary would accept by a trustee because a shareholder expects to earn greater
profits by permitting the directors to take risks. See Veasey & Manning, supra note 39, at
925. For an excellent discussion of the shareholders' desire for their directors to take certain
risks, see W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION & FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES 188-219 (2d ed. 1986).
For a contrary view on the use of the term "fiduciary" in the corporate context, see
Knauss, Corporate Governance-A Moving Target, 79 MICH. L. REV. 478, 496-500 (1981)
(suggesting that the label "fiduciary" is appropriate to describe a director's position of trust
to the corporation's shareholders).
42. See E. BRODSKY & M. ADAMSKI, THE LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS:
RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES § 2.04 (1984). The authors state that in many cases there is
no evidence "that a different result would have been reached in the absence of a statute."
Id.; cf. Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of Am., 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966). In
Selheimer the Pennsylvania statute in question required a director to act with the care that
an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances in conducting per-
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rather they make their decisions on a case-by-case basis,43 with lit-
tle regard to the specific level of care required." In addition, courts
and commentators alike never have agreed on the level of care re-
quired by state statutes, some of which are identical to the Revised
Model Act.45
Most courts have ruled that the required level of care is "ordi-
nary care" and impose liability for its correlative, "ordinary negli-
gence. '46 Some courts, however, maintain that the prevailing level
of care is "gross negligence. ''47 Commentators have argued that the
result of a given case cannot be predicted accurately from the stan-
dard adopted 48 and that liability depends more on prevailing busi-
ness practices and on the jury's perception of a director's con-
duct.49 Given this confusion, the Revised Model Act, despite its
general goal, is unlikely to add uniformity to future state court
decisions.5 0
sonal business affairs. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted this provision to im-
pose a more strict standard of care than had been imposed under the common law. The
Pennsylvania legislature subsequently deleted the "personal business affairs" language from
its due care statute. Some states, however, such as Nebraska, still require a director to exer-
cise the degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in conducting per-
sonal business affairs. See Lewis, The Business Judgment Rule and Corporate Directors'
Liability for Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOR L. REV. 157, 163 (1970). For a more thorough anal-
ysis of the fluctuations in Pennsylvania law on the duty of care, see supra An Historical
Perspective (Special Project) notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
43. See supra An Historical Perspective (Special Project) notes 24-30 and accompa-
nying text.
44. For a discussion of the various standards for the duty of care, see id. notes 11-14
and accompanying text.
45. Thirty-three states follow the general pattern of the Revised Model Act/Model
Act of imposing a statutory duty of care on directors. Seven states have adopted the specific
Revised Model Act/Model Act formulation. See 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30
annotation at 936 (3d ed. Supp. 1986); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 28 (Tent. Draft No. 3, Apr. 13, 1984).
46. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 34, 432 A.2d 814, 823 (1981)
(establishing ordinary care as the standard in New Jersey); Fisher v. Parr, 92 Md. 245, 48 A.
621 (1901); see also supra An Historical Perspective (Special Project) notes 12 & 20 and
accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Bishop, Sitting Ducks
and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers,
77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1101 (1968) (stating that "[a]ll in all I remain skeptical of the proposition
that directors . . . run any substantial risk of liability for ordinary negligence"); see also
supra An Historical Perspective (Special Project) note 11 and accompanying text.
48. See Dyson, The Director's Liability for Negligence, 40 IND. L.J. 341, 371 (1965)
(arguing that the standard used by a court will not help in predicting how the court will rule
in a given case).
49. See Arsht & Hinsey, supra note 39, at x-xiii.
50. See Veasey & Manning, supra note 39, at 927 (asserting that "[g]iven the disa-
greement over how much care is due under section 35. . . one questions whether uniform
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C. The Standard of Care
1. In General
The Revised Model Act describes section 8.30(a) as setting
forth a "general standard of care for all directors."'" Despite the
"traditional and generic"5 quality of section 8.30(a), special atten-
tion should be given to certain words and phrases used in the sec-
tion. The "care" a director must exercise extends not only to sub-
stantive business decisions,53 but also to the director's "duty of
attention. 5 4 This duty includes a director's responsibility to over-
see the corporation's activities55 and to monitor those to whom au-
thority has been delegated.58
adoption will produce uniform results").
51. REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.30 official comment at 221. A "flexible expres-
sion of the duty of care" requires a director to "assume a duty to act carefully in fulfilling
the important tasks of monitoring and directing the activities of corporate management."
Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1595, 1600-1601 (1978) [hereinafter
Guidebook].
52. See Veasey & Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Revised Model Act, the
Trans Union Case, and the ALI Project-A Strange Porridge, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1483, 1493
(1985); Subak, supra note 37, at 1260.
53. It generally is recognized that directors must use due care during the decision-
making process. This requires obtaining sufficient information to make an "informed" deci-
sion and devoting an appropriate amount of time to making the decision. A court's review of
the decisionmaking process, however, does not extend to a review of the "correctness" of the
decision. The substantive aspects of the decision are protected by the business judgment
rule. See Veasey & Seitz, supra note 52, at 1486; see also supra notes 33-34 and accompany-
ing text.
54. See Guidebook, supra note 51, at 1601 (stating that "care" includes "the statu-
tory expression of the duty of attention").
55. Id. at 1602. This aspect of the duty of attention includes attending board meet-
ings on a regular basis, obtaining adequate information, analyzing this information carefully,
and reviewing documentation at board meetings. Id. A director may become involved in the
daily management of the corporation to any extent the director chooses, but § 8.30 estab-
lishes the director's minimum permissible involvement. See REVISED MBCA, supra note 4,
§ 8.01 official comment at 195. Once a director encounters a "red flag," however, the duty of
inquiry requires the director to take the necessary affirmative steps to remedy the situation.
56. This duty to monitor stems from a director's authority, provided by § 8.01, to
delegate duties to the officers. The directors have a duty to monitor management's activities
and actual performance. Directors will not be held personally responsible for the actions or
omissions of the officers, employees, or agents of the corporation if the directors have acted
reasonably in selecting them and in relying on their actions (i.e., if the directors have met
the duty of care set forth in § 8.30). See Guidebook, supra note 51, at 1602-03; REVISED
MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.01 official comment at 195; REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.30
official comment at 221.
Only one state-California-explicitly declares in its due care statute that the duty of
care includes a duty of attention. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 1977) (stating that
directors are to act "with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent
person") (emphasis added).
One commentator has proposed that the duty of care provision of the Revised Model
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The phrase "in a like position under similar circumstances" is
the Revised Model Act's method of distinguishing between direc-
tors' different levels of skill or knowledge concerning the corpora-
tion. 7 This phrase gives courts the latitude to consider any special
skill or experience a director may possess s.5  The phrase also recog-
nizes that a director's responsibilities will vary with the size, loca-
tion, and complexity of the corporation.59
2. The Revised Model Act's Standard of Care
and the Business Judgment Rule
The standard of care enunciated in section 8.30(a) embodies
within it the concept that a director, regardless of the level of care
required by statute, should not be held liable for an honest mis-
take of business judgment;60 this concept otherwise is known as the
business judgment rule."' Section 8.30(a), however, does not at-
Act be replaced by a duty of attention provision. See Manning, supra note 7.
57. A distinction can be drawn between inside and outside directors. See supra An
Historical Perspective (Special Project) notes 93-106 and accompanying text. The Revised
Model Act, however, does not draw this distinction. Instead, the Revised Model Act merely
takes into account "the special background, qualifications, and management responsibilities
of a particular director." REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.30 offical comment at 222 (em-
phasis added). This language also can be interpreted to distinguish between the responsibili-
ties of a director and an officer.
58. See supra note 57. A director's greater skill or experience with regard to the cor-
poration will place a greater responsibility on that director. For example, a director who has
special expertise in an area that touches on a particular transaction is expected to use that
knowledge, or be charged with a breach of the duty of care. See Arsht & Hinsey, supra note
39, at xiv. This language, however, does not excuse a director who lacks business experience
from exercising the common sense and informed judgment of an "ordinarily prudent per-
son." See REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.30 official comment at 222.
59. See REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.30 official comment at 222 (advising that
"the phrase 'in a like position. . . under similar circumstances' is intended to recognize that
.. . the nature and extent of responsibilities will vary, depending upon such factors as the
size, complexity, urgency, and location of activities carried on by the particular
corporation").
60. This result is achieved by combining the requirement of "good faith" with the
requirement that a director act "with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would use under similar circumstances." Report of Committee on Corporate Laws:
Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 30 Bus. LAw. 501, 504 (1975).
61. The business judgment rule insulates corporate decisionmakers from personal lia-
bility for good faith mistakes in judgment. The Supreme Court of Delaware explained that
the rule contains "a presumption that in making a business decision the directors. . . acted
on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Thus, di-
rectors who demonstrate that their decisionmaking process met the requisite duty of care
will not be held liable for making a bad business decision.
The justifications for the rule are that courts are ill-equipped to make business judg-
ments and that courts should not second-guess the substantive decisions of directors. See
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tempt to codify the business judgment rule. 2 Rather, the Revised
Hinsey, Business Judgment and the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Pro-
ject: The Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 609, 612 n.21 (1984).
The court in Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), discussed the relationship between
the duty of care and the business judgment rule as follows:
While it is often stated that corporate directors and officers will be liable for negligence
in carrying out their corporate duties, all seem agreed that such a statement is mislead-
ing. Whereas an automobile driver who makes a mistake in judgment. . . will likely be
called upon to respond in damages, a corporate officer who makes a mistake in judg-
ment. . . will rarely, if ever, be found liable for damages suffered by the corporation.
Whatever the terminology, the fact is that liability is rarely imposed upon corporate
directors or officers simply for bad judgment ....
Id. at 885. The North court explained this phenomenon by stating that:
[C]ourts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate
corporate business decisions. The circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are
not easily reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since business imperatives often
call for quick decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect information. The entre-
preneur's function is to encounter risks and to confront uncertainty . . . . [Ilt is very
much in the interest of shareholders that the law not create incentives for overly cau-
tious corporate decisions.
Id. at 886; see also W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, supra note 41, at 141, 188-89. For a further
discussion of the business judgment rule, see supra An Historical Perspective (Special Pro-
ject) notes 50-79 and accompanying text
62. See REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.30 official comment at 220-21. The official
comment states, "Section 8.30 defines the general standard of conduct for directors. . . by
focusing on the manner in which the director performs his duties, not the correctness of
his decisions." Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, the official comment restates the underlying philosophy of the business judgment
rule: directors' substantive decisions should not be questioned by the courts if there was a
rational business purpose for the decision. The official comment further states:
Even before statutory formulations of directors' duty of care, courts sometimes invoked
the business judgment rule in determining whether to impose liability in a particular
case. In doing so, courts have sometimes used language similar to the standards set
forth in section 8.30(a). The elements of the business judgment rule and the circum-
stances for its application are continuing to be developed by the courts. In view of that
continuing judicial development, section 8.30 does not try to codify the business judg-
ment rule or to delineate the differences, if any, between that rule and the standards of
director conduct set forth in this section. That is a task left to the courts and possibly
to later revision of this Model Act.
Id. at 221.
Section 8.30 of the 1983 Exposure Draft sought to integrate the business judgment rule
with the duty of care. The official comment contained extensive analysis of the relationship
between the business judgment rule and the duty of care. After receiving numerous negative
comments on the Exposure Draft, however, the Committee decided to stay with the lan-
guage of the Model Act. See 2 MODEL BusiNEss CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30 annotation at 933-34
(3d ed. Supp. 1986).
Exposure Draft § 8.30(a)(1)-(2) was identical to the Revised Model Act. Exposure Draft
§ 8.30(a)(3), however, was different. It read as follows: "when exercising his business judg-
ment, with the belief, premised on a rational basis, that his decision is in the best interest of
the corporation." REVISED MBCA § 8.30(a)(3) (Exposure Draft 1983) (emphasis added).
One commentator stated that Exposure Draft § 8.30(a)(3) was a mix of subjective and
objective elements that suffered from redundancy problems. See Cohn, Demise of the Direc-
tor's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business
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Model Act leaves courts free to develop their own formulations of
the rule. 3 The business judgment rule is applied most often to di-
rectors' substantive business decisions. 4 While a court should
scrutinize a director's decisionmaking process,65 the business judg-
ment rule prohibits a court from questioning the actual substan-
tive decision that eventually results from that process if any "ra-
tional business purpose" for the decision exists.6
Section 8.30 addresses the issue of due care during the deci-
sionmaking process6 7 and also creates a "safe-harbor" in section
8.30(d)."8 Section 8.30(d) provides that if a director fulfills the duty
of care under section 8.30(a), the director is not liable for any ac-
tion taken as a director.6 9 A debate has developed concerning
Judgment Rule, 62 TEx. L. REV. 591, 593 n.7 (1983).
63. See Veasey & Seitz, supra note 52, at 1495 (advising that "the comment to [Re-
vised] MBCA section 8.30 makes it clear that the section is not intended to codify the busi-
ness judgment rule"). For an overview of the various judicial formulations of the business
judgment rule, see supra An Historical Perspective (Special Project) notes 52-59 and ac-
companying text.
64. Decisions to delegate authority, however, also can be protected by the business
judgment rule if the decision to delegate is made consistent with all elements of the rule.
See Kelly v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62, 72 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff'd, 266 A.2d 878 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970).
65. See Veasey & Seitz, supra note 52, at 1486 (stating that "Delaware Courts have
employed the term 'gross negligence' to describe the standard of care used in the decision-
making process" and that "gross negligence should not be the touchstone of judicial review
of substantive business decisions; rather, judicial review of substantive decisions should be
limited to the search for an 'abuse of discretion'-which equates to the lack of a rational
business purpose")(emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted); see also supra An Historical
Perspective (Special Project) note 65 and accompanying text.
66. See Veasey & Seitz, supra note 52, at 1486; see also supra An Historical Perspec-
tive (Special Project) notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
67. The official comment to § 8.30 states:
The process by which a director informs himself will vary but the duty of care requires
every director to take steps to become informed about the background facts and cir-
cumstances before taking action on the matter at hand. In relying upon the perform-
ance by management of delegated or assigned duties pursuant to section 8.01 . . . the
director may depend upon the presumption of regularity, absent knowledge or notice to
the contrary . . . . Furthermore, a director should not be expected to anticipate the
problems which the corporation may face except in those circumstances where some-
thing has occurred to make it obvious to a director that the corporation should be
addressing a particular problem.
R.visED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.30 official comment at 222-23.
68. Section 8.30(d) provides, "A director is not liable for any action taken as a direc-
tor, or any failure to take any action, if he performed the duties of his office in compliance
with this section." Id. For the full text of § 8.30, see supra note 28.
69. See id. The official comment to § 8.30 further explains:
If compliance with the standard of conduct set forth in. . . section 8.30 is established,
there is no need to consider possible application of the business judgment rule. The
possible application of the business judgment rule need only be considered if compli-
ance with the standard of conduct set forth in . . . section 8.30 is not established.
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whether the phrase "reasonably believes" contained in section
8.30(a)(3) could negate the safe-harbor created by section 8.30(d).70
Some commentators argue that this phrase could cause courts to
second-guess directors' decisions in areas in which the business
judgment rule should apply to protect the decisions from judicial
scrutiny. 1 These commentators suggest that courts might feel that
section 8.30(a) requires them to analyze the "reasonableness" of a
director's substantive business decision despite the business judg-
ment rule's mandate that any substantive decision that was
reached as a result of a director's exercise of due care and that had
a "rational business purpose" be upheld automatically. Other
commentators, however, argue that it is unlikely that courts will
blockade section 8.30(d)'s safe-harbor in this fashion.73 These com-
mentators assert that the "reasonable belief' language merely will
force courts to inquire into the procedural aspects of a director's
decision to discover whether there was a firm basis for the direc-
tor's substantive decision.74 Thus, a court will determine if the di-
rector met the section 8.30(a) duty of care standard during the
decisionmaking process. Furthermore, there has been no indica-
tion that courts will use the "reasonably believes" language to
question the judgment of directors.75
The debate outlined above raises another question concerning
section 8.30(a). Does the business judgment rule apply if a director
does not qualify for the safe-harbor of 8.30(d)? Given the courts
usual lack of concern for a precise definition of "due care" and for
the level of care this definition requires, 7  it is unlikely that courts
will feel restrained by the language of section 8.30(a) if they decide
Id. § 8.30 official comment at 224.
70. Compare Veasey & Manning, supra note 39, at 930-42 (arguing that Model Act
§ 35 deviates from the common law of Delaware because the term "reasonably believes" will
encourage courts to substitute their own judgment for that of the defendant director) with
Arsht & Hinsey, supra note 39, at xvii-xx (arguing that use of the "reasonably believes"
language will have no effect on the development of the duty of care).
71. See Veasey & Manning, supra note 39, at 930-42.
72. Id.
73. See Arsht & Hinsey, supra note 39, at xviii-xix.
74. Id. Samuel Arsht, a member of the Committee from 1967 to 1977, and Joseph
Hinsey, Chairman of the Committee at the time of the Revised Model Act's adoption, argue
that the "reasonably believes" language merely requires courts to determine if a director's
belief that the decision was in the corporation's best interest was reasonable. Section 8.30(a)
does not ask the court to determine if the substantive business decision was correct or
reasonable.
75. Courts have exhibited a reluctance to "apply diligence standards against well-
intentioned, non-self-enriching directors and officers." Cohn, supra note 62, at 593.
76. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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that the business judgment rule should apply." Thus, even if
courts interpret the "reasonably believes" language to allow judi-
cial scrutiny of a director's judgment, and even if the director has
not met the requirements of section 8.30(a), a court still could ap-
ply the business judgment rule and find the director not liable.7 8
This conclusion is supported by the Committee's decision not to
codify the business judgment rule, but rather to let the courts de-
fine the rule's boundaries. 7
Unlike the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate
Governance," which soon will include a draft on "Transactions
and Control," 81 the Revised Model Act does not specifically con-
sider a director's duty of care in the context of takeover battles or
derivative actions. In the context of a takeover battle or a deriva-
tive action, a director's decisionmaking role changes significantly.8 2
In the takeover context, a director, because of a self-interest in re-
maining employed, may not make a totally disinterested decision.
The decision, therefore, may lack the element of good faith that is
necessary for the business judgment rule to apply.83 Some recent
77. See Veasey & Seitz, supra note 52, at 1496 (stating that "rightly or wrongly, the
Committee concluded that there were too many imponderables that might arise in future
cases to say that the business judgment rule would never protect one who had flunked the
standard ... in section 8.30"); see also supra note 69; Cohn, supra note 62, at 594. Professor
Cohn argues that the business judgment rule often is invoked to protect a director's decision
without the court even entering into an analysis of the director's due care during the deci-
sionmaking process. For an analysis of whether the business judgment rule has supplanted
the duty of care, see supra An Historical Perspective (Special Project) notes 60-67 and
accompanying text.
78. See Veasey & Seitz, supra note 52, at 1496. The Revised Model Act's official
comment states:
If compliance with the standard of conduct set forth in former section 35 or section
8.30 is established, there is no need to consider possible application of the business
judgment rule. The possible application of the business judgment rule need only be
considered if compliance with the standard of conduct set forth in former section 35 or
section 8.30 is not established.
REviSED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.30(d) official comment at 224. The Revised Model Act
does not establish specific limits on the application of the business judgment rule in situa-
tions in which a director has not met the requirements of § 8.30(a).
79. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
80. For a discussion of the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance, see infra ALI Proposals (Special Project).
81. Id.
82. In both of these situations a director has some self-interest in the outcome of the
decision: maintaining employment in the takeover context and avoiding a potential lawsuit
in the derivative suit context. Because a lack of self-interest in the transaction is a prerequi-
site for application of the business judgment rule, special consideration must be given to its
application in these situations.
83. For a discussion of self-interest transactions, see infra notes 99-155 and accompa-
nying text.
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court decisions have placed the initial burden on the director to
prove that the defensive measures taken were reasonable. Once
this burden is satisfied, the business judgment rule applies.8 The
derivative action, with its inherent conflict of interest problems, 5
also calls for special treatment vis a vis the business judgment
rule.86
D. Reasonable Reliance on Opinions of Others
Section 8.30(b)-(c) provides that directors, in discharging
their duties, are entitled to rely on information, opinions, and re-
ports prepared by the corporation's officers, employees, legal coun-
sel, public accountants, and board of directors committees.8 7 In ad-
dition, directors may rely on other persons with professional or
expert competence.8 Directors, however, must fulfill their duty of
care under section 8.30(a) by determining whether reliance on the
84. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). The Moran
court placed the burden on the defendant-directors to show (1) that they believed in good
faith that there was a threat to the corporation, (2) that they met their duty of due care,
and (3) that the steps taken were reasonable in relation to the threat posed. Id. at 1356. For
an excellent discussion of the law in this area, see Note, Target Directors' Fiduciary Duties:
An Initial Reasonableness Burden, 61 NoTa DAME L. REV. 722 (1986). See also supra Re-
cent Developments (Special Project) notes 100-102. But see Lipton, Takeover Bids in the
Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 120 (1979) (arguing that the business judgment rule
should apply in a takeover situation); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisitions, Inc., 781
F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying the business judgment rule to a corporate control
situation).
85. See supra note 82; supra Recent Developments (Special Project) note 22.
86. Some courts have held, in the context of a derivative suit, that because of the
possibility for directors to make less than good faith decisions, a court should second-guess a
director's (or special litigation committee's) decision not to go forward with a derivative suit.
See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d
797 (Del. 1981); see also supra Recent Developments (Special Project) notes 22-47. But see
Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (1979) (applying the business judgment rule in a de-
rivative suit situation).
The Revised Model Act contains a section on the procedural requirements for pursuing
a derivative action. See REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 7.40. A full discussion of that sec-
tion and its relation to the duty of care, however, is beyond the scope of this Special Project
Note. According to the official comment to § 7.40, the issue of whether the board of direc-
tors' decision to terminate a derivative suit should bar the derivative suit is left unresolved
by the Revised Model Act. Id. official comment at 189.
87. See REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.30(b)-(c); see also supra note 28 (providing
full text of § 8.30(b)-(c)).
A director's ability to rely on the guidance of others in discharging the director's duties
follows directly from the limited nature of a director's duties and the necessity for a director
to delegate authority in the manner outlined in § 8.30(c). See supra note 13 and accompany-
ing text.
88. REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.30(b)-(c).
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person's information, report, or opinion is warranted. 9 Indeed, di-
rectors should complement the information received from an ex-
pert, officer, or professional with questions and a discussion 0 to
determine whether reliance on their report or opinion is justified.
In addition, section 8.30(c) 91 prevents a director from "hiding
his head in the sand."92 A director, therefore, cannot rely on infor-
mation that the director knows is unreliable. Section 8.30(c) ex-
pressly provides that reliance by a director on information known
to be unreliable is unreasonable and in bad faith.93 Reliance on
information known to be unreliable would subject a director to lia-
bility for breach of the duty of care under section 8.30(a). Section
8.30(c), however, only declares that a director acts in bad faith
when the director has actual knowledge 94 that makes reliance on
the information unreasonable. Thus, section 8.30(c) provides a
more lenient standard than the common law, which held a director
accountable for any inputed or actual knowledge that made reli-
ance unwarranted. 5 Section 8.30(b) also may be more lenient than
some other statutory standards 8 because it allows directors to rely
on the opinions of "other persons. . . [with] professional or expert
competence" 97 even if these persons are not certified by state
89. See id. § 8.30 official comment at 223 (advising that "the director must comply
with the general standard of care of section 8.30(a) in making a judgment as to the reliabil-
ity and competence of the source of information").
90. See Guidebook, supra note 51, at 1603. A director cannot rely mechanistically on
another's report or opinion. The director must question the reliability of the report or opin-
ion in order to make an informed judgment. Id. The business judgment rule will not shield a
director's judgment if it is uninformed or irrational. See supra notes 61-63 and accompany-
ing text.
91. REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.30(c). For the full text of § 8.30(c), see supra
note 28.
92. REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.30 official comment at 224.
93. See id. § 8.30(c).
94. Section 8.30(c) only refers to "knowledge;" the official comment, however, states
that a director must have "actual knowledge." Id. official comment at 224.
95. See Veasey, Director's Standard of Care Under Section 35 of the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act, 3 DEL. J. CORP. L. 257, 262-63 (1978). In Graham v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963), the court required the plaintiffs to prove that
the directors had actual or imputed notice of wrongdoing that would have made reliance on
the officers' performance unwarranted. It is unclear what would have constituted "imputed
notice" to the Allis-Chalmers court. See Veasey, supra, at 261. The Allis-Chalmers court
merely stated that "directors are entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of their subor-
dinates until something occurs to put them on suspicion that something is wrong." Allis-
Chalmers, 41 Del. Ch. at 85, 188 A.2d at 130 (emphasis added).
96. Section 8.30(b)(2) allows reliance on all "other persons... [with] professional or
expert competence." "Experts" need not be certified by the state. The Securities Act of 1933
and some state statutes, however, require that "experts" be certified by state authorities.
97. REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.30(b)(2) official comment at 224. The official
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authorities.98
IV. THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
Corporate directors and officers owe a duty of undivided and
unqualified loyalty to the corporation. 9 This duty of loyalty re-
quires directors and officers to act in the best interests of the cor-
poration and its stockholders and not in their own self-interest.0°
While the duty of loyalty has been applied to both directors and
officers' °1 in a variety of contexts, 102 Revised Model Act section
8.31103 limits its discussion to "conflict of interest" and "self-deal-
comment makes a distinction between the words "competence" with regard to experts and
"confidence" with regard to a board committee. "Competence" recognizes technical skill and
experience in the expert's chosen field. "Confidence" infers no specific technical skill. Id.
98. Id. at 223. Experts that are not typically certified by state authorities include
investment bankers, geologists, and actuaries. Id.
99. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939) (stating
that "corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and
confidence to further their private interests... [and that] a rule that requires an undivided
and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between
duty and self-interest"). For a thorough analysis of the duty of loyalty, see supra An Histor-
ical Perspective (Special Project) notes 115-40 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984)
(stating that "the duty of loyalty derives from the prohibition against self-dealing that in-
heres in a fiduciary relationship"); see also supra An Historical Perspective (Special Pro-
ject) notes 115-16 and accompanying text. See generally Ruder, Duty of Loyalty-A Law
Professor's Status Report, 40 Bus. LAW. 1383 (1985).
101. See E. BRODSKY & M. ADAMSKY, supra note 42, at § 3.01.
102. The duty of loyalty applies in many contexts. Situations other than transactions
arising out of conflict of interest or self-dealing that require a duty of loyalty inquiry are the
corporate opportunity doctrine, insider trading, and transactions between corporations with
interlocking directorates. See Ruder, supra note 100, at 1386, 1389-1402; see also supra An
Historical Perspective (Special Project) notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
103. Section 8.31 provides:
(a) A conflict of interest transaction is a transaction with the corporation in which
a director of the corporation has a direct or indirect interest. A conflict of interest
transaction is not voidable by the corporation solely because of the director's interest
in the transaction if any one of the following is true:
(1) The material facts of the transaction and the director's interest were dis-
closed or known to the board of directors or a committee of the board of directors
and the board of directors or committee authorized, approved, or ratified the
transaction;
(2) the material facts of the transaction and the director's interest were dis-
closed or known to the shareholders entitled to vote and they authorized, ap-
proved, or ratified the transaction; or
(3) the transaction was fair to the corporation.
(b) For purposes of this section, a director of the corporation has an indirect inter-
est in a transaction if (1) another entity in which he has a material financial interest or
in which he is a general partner is a party to the transaction or (2) another entity of
which he is a director, officer, or trustee is a party to the transaction and the transac-
tion is or should be considered by the board of directors of the corporation.
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ing" transactions'0 involving directors. 10 5
A. The Voidability of Conflict of Interest Transactions
1. In General
Revised Model Act section 8.31(a) follows the substance and
overall effect of Model Act section 41, but simplifies it with stylis-
tic changes. 106 Section 8.31(a) rejects the traditional common-law
view that all conflict of interest transactions are voidable at the
(c) For purposes of subsection (a)(1), a conflict of interest transaction is author-
ized, approved, or ratified if it receives the affirmative vote of a majority of the direc-
tors on the board of directors (or on the committee) who have no direct or indirect
interest in the transaction, but a transaction may not be authorized, approved, or rati-
fied under this section by a single director. If a majority of the directors who have no
direct or indirect interest in the transaction vote to authorize, approve, or ratify the
transaction, a quorum is present for the purpose of taking action under this section.
The presence of, or a vote cast by, a director with a direct or indirect interest in the
transaction does not affect the validity of any action taken under subsection (a)(1) if
the transaction is otherwise authorized, approved, or ratified as provided in that
subsection.
(d) For purposes of subsection (a)(2), a conflict of interest transaction is author-
ized, approved, or ratified if it receives the vote of a majority of the shares entitled to
be counted under this subsection. Shares owned by or voted under the control of a
director who has a direct or indirect interest in the transaction, and shares owned by or
voted under the control of an entity described in subsection (b)(1), may not be counted
in a vote of shareholders to determine whether to authorize, approve, or ratify a con-
flict of interest transaction under subsection (a)(2). The vote of those shares, however,
is counted in determining whether the transaction is approved under other sections of
this Act. A majority of the shares, whether or not present, that are entitled to be
counted in a vote on the transaction under this subsection constitutes a quorum for the
purpose of taking action under this section.
REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.31.
104. The official comment states that "[s]ection 8.31 deals only with 'conflict of inter-
est' transactions by a director with the corporation, that is, transactions in which the direc-
tor has an interest either (1) directly, or (2) indirectly through an entity in which the direc-
tor has a financial or managerial interest covered by section 8.31(b)." Id. § 8.31 official
comment at 227 (emphasis added). In addition, the official comment makes it clear that the
Revised Model Act does not attempt to define completely a director's duty of loyalty. Id.
105. The Exposure Draft to the Revised Model Act included directors and officers
within the scope of § 8.31. See REvIsED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.31 (Exposure Draft 1983).
Officers, however, were not included in the Revised Model Act because the Committee felt
that the tests of § 8.31(a)(1)-(2) were not appropriate for officers. See 2 MODEL BusiNEss
CORP. AcT ANN. § 8.31 annotation at 966 (3d ed. Supp. 1986). Presumably, treatment of
officers and the duty of loyalty is left to the common law.
106. See 2 MODEL BusiNss CORP. Aar ANN. § 8.31 annotation at 966 (3d ed. Supp.
1986). Section 8.31(a) contains many stylistic changes. For example, the revised test for a
fair transaction is whether the transaction is "fair," instead of "fair and reasonable." The
Revised Model Act's drafters felt that "reasonable" added nothing of substance to the test.
Id.
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will of the corporation regardless of whether the transaction was
fair to the corporation or was approved by the board of directors or
shareholders. 107 Instead, the Revised Model Act sets forth the fol-
lowing three-pronged "or" test:
A conflict of interest transaction is a transaction with the corporation in
which a director of the corporation has a direct or indirect interest. A conflict
of interest transaction is not voidable by the corporation solely because of the
director's interest in the transaction if any one of the following is true:
(1) the material facts of the transaction and the director's interests were
disclosed or known to the board of directors or a committee of the board of
directors and the board of directors or committee authorized, approved, or
ratified the transaction; or
(2) the material facts of the transaction and the director's interest were
disclosed or known to the shareholders entitled to vote and they authorized,
approved, or ratified the transaction; or
(3) the transaction was fair to the corporation. 0 8
Read literally, section 8.31(a) would appear to provide that a
transaction cannot be invalidated by the corporation on conflict of
interest grounds 0 9 if any one of the three criteria of section 8.31(a)
is satisfied. Courts, however, generally have interpreted this provi-
sion to be consistent with the common law, which requires that
conflict of interest transactions be fair to the corporation before
they will be validated.110 Approval of the transaction by a disinter-
107. REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.31 official comment at 227. Historically, all
conflict of interest transactions were voidable at the election of the corporation. A few juris-
dictions, however, took a more rigid position and held that conflict of interest transactions
were void automatically. Most jurisdictions eventually adopted a more lenient stance and
permitted conflict of interest transactions to stand if they met a test of "intrinsic fairness to
the corporation" and if the director fully disclosed any interest in the transaction. For fur-
ther discussion, see supra An Historical Perspective (Special Project) notes 117-20 and ac-
companying text.
108. REViSED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.31(a)(emphasis added). Section 8.31 is pat-
terned after "interested director" statutes in California, Delaware, New Jersey, and New
York. These state statutes were in existence at the time Model Act § 41 was drafted. See
CAL. CORP. LAW § 820 (West 1955); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A: 6-8 (West 1969) (amended 1972); N.Y. BusiNEss CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1963)
(amended 1971). The California statute was amended in 1975. See CAL. CORP. LAW § 310
(West 1977).
109. Section 8.31 does not validate transactions. Instead, it provides that if the criteria
of § 8.31(a) are met, a director's conflict of interest is not a ground for invalidating the
transaction. A transaction still can be attacked on other grounds, such as fraud, breach of
the director's duty of care when approving the transaction, or waste. See REVISED MBCA,
supra note 4, § 8.31 official comment at 228. The sole purpose of § 8.31 is to make sure that
the common-law rule of automatic voidability no longer is followed. Id.
110. See, e.g., Rivercity v. American Can Co., 600 F. Supp. 908, 919-22 (E.D. La.
1984), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that a director cannot validate an unfair
transaction by mere disclosure to and approval by a disinterested board of directors);
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 417, 241 P.2d 66, 73
(1952) (stating that to allow mere disclosure to and consent by the board to validate unfair
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ested and fully informed board or by the shareholders will be sig-
nificant, if at all, only to shift the burden of proving the fairness of
the transaction from the director trying to uphold the transaction
to the person attacking it."' One court has justified this position
by pointing out that the Delaware conflict of interest statute,
which is almost identical to section 8.31, merely meant to provide
that self-dealing transactions are not voidable automatically.
112
Section 8.31(a), therefore, probably will not prevent judicial scru-
transactions would be a "shocking reflection on the law of California" and would allow con-
niving directors to get around the law).
Giving effect to the "or" language would be a major departure from the common-law
rule, which requires that the transaction be fair to the corporation. See Note, Section 21-
2040.01: Interested Director Transactions and Considerations of Fairness, 58 NEB. L. REV.
909, 912-13 (1979).
111. For a discussion of the burden of proof, see infra notes 126-36 and accompanying
text.
The Revised Model Act's Exposure Draft established this very scheme of shifting the
burden from director to plaintiff to handle conflict of interest transactions. In fact, the Ex-
posure Draft was intended to reflect the current judicial interpretation of Model Act § 41.
Section 8.31 of the Exposure Draft provided:
(a) If a transaction is fair to a corporation at the time it is authorized, approved, or
ratified, the fact that a director or officer of the corporation has a direct or indirect
interest in the transaction is not a ground for invalidating the transaction or for impos-
ing liability on that director or officer.
(b) In a proceeding contesting the validity of a transaction in which a director or
officer has an interest, the person asserting validity has the burden of proving fairness
unless:
(1) the material facts of the transaction and the director's or officer's interests
were disclosed or known to the board of directors or a committee of the board and
the board or committee authorized, approved, or ratified the transaction by the
vote of a requisite quorum of directors who had no interest in the transaction; or
(2) the material facts of the transaction and the director's or officer's interests
were disclosed to the shareholders entitled to vote and they authorized, approved,
or ratified the transaction by the vote of a requisite quorum of shareholders who
had no interest in the transaction.
(c) The presence of, or votes entitled to be cast by, the director or officer who has a
direct or indirect interest in the transaction may be counted in determining whether a
quorum is present but may not be counted when the board of directors, a committee of
the board, or the shareholders vote on the transaction.
(d) For purposes of this section, a director or officer has an indirect interest in a
transaction if an entity in which he has a material financial interest or in which he is an
officer, director, or general partner is a party to the transaction. A vote or consent of
that entity is deemed to be a vote or consent of the director or officer for purposes of
subsection (c).
REvSED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.31 (Exposure Draft 1983).
112. See Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976). The Fliegler court stated:
We do not read the statute as providing the broad immunity for which defendants
contend. It merely removes an 'interested director' cloud when its terms are met and
provides against invalidation of an agreement 'solely' because such a director or officer
is involved. Nothing in the statute sanctions unfairness. . . or removes the transaction
from judicial scrutiny.
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tiny of fairness even if there has been approval by a fully informed
and disinterested board or by the shareholders. ' s The Revised
Model Act's Exposure Draft structured this section to be consis-
tent with judicial interpretations of the Model Act. 1'4 This struc-
turing, coupled with the Revised Model Act's official comments,"' 5
appears to indicate that the Revised Model Act was not intended
to change present judicial interpretations of the law concerning
conflict of interest transactions."06
2. Determining What is "Fair" to the Corporation
Assuming that courts are unlikely to approve conflict of inter-
est transactions if they are not fair to the corporation, the question
of how to determine fairness arises. No single precise formula has
been developed; ' 7 the most pervasive test, and the one apparently
adopted by the Revised Model Act,"' is the "arm's length bargain"
test that the United States Supreme Court established in Pepper
v. Litton."' Under this test, a court must determine, given all the
113. Id. at 222; see supra note 110. However, a literal interpretation of a statute simi-
lar to § 8.31 was adopted in a Tennessee lower court decision. See Tennessee Dressed Beef
Co. v. Hall, 519 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974). This interpretation was criticized in
Recent Development, Corporations-Duty of Loyalty and Corporate Opportu-
nity-Transactions Between Corporations with Common Directors, 43 TENN. L. REV. 155
(1975).
114. See supra note 111.
115. See supra notes 109 & 112 and accompanying text.
116. This view is bolstered by the comments of Henry Ballantine, a drafter of former
CAL. CORP. CODE § 820 (conflict of interest), one of the statutes upon which the Model Act
was based. According to Mr. Ballantine, the drafters of the former California statute did not
intend to affect the entire common law dealing with transactions that were unfair, but in-
tended only to overcome the procedural problems surrounding interested directors. Ballan-
tine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporation Law, 19 CALM. L. REV. 465, 475-
76 (1931).
117. See Note, supra note 110, at 920. The determination of fairness is a question of
fact that must be made on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v.
Joanna-Western Mills Co., 53 Ill. App. 3d 542, 555, 368 N.E.2d 629, 639 (1977) (stating that
"[i]n our view, the fairness of an agreement is a question of fact").
118. The official comment to § 8.31 states:
The fairness of a transaction for purposes of section 8.31 should be evaluated on the
basis of the facts and circumstances as they were known or should have been known at
the time the transaction was entered into. For example, the terms of a transaction
subject to section 8.31 should normally be deemed "fair" if they are within the range
that might have been entered into at arms length by disinterested persons.
REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.31 official comment at 230 (emphasis added).
119. 308 U.S. 295 (1939). In Pepper the Supreme Court stated, "The essence of the
test is whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction carries the earmark's of an
arm's length bargain." Id. at 306-07.
An alternative test is whether the proposition submitted would have commended itself
to a wholly independent board of directors. Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 490, 121
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:663
facts and circumstances, whether a disinterested board of directors
would have accepted the transaction in an arm's length bargain. 2 '
The official comment to section 8.31 states that fairness should be
determined "on the basis of the facts and circumstances as they
were known or should have been known at the time the transaction
was entered into."'' Under the Revised Model Act's arm's length
bargain test, a court will consider whether the transaction was in
the best interests of the corporation. 12 2 It is unclear from section
8.31, however, whether the fairness consideration should include a
determination of whether the board was advised about the direc-
tor's interest in the transaction and about the material facts con-
cerning that interest.123 These factors, however, appear to go be-
yond the facial requirements of the "arm's length bargain" test
and effectively force the interested director to meet two prongs 124
of the three-prong "or" test.12 5
A.2d 919, 925 (1956).
120. See Webber, Arkansas Corporate Fiduciary Standards-Interested Directors'
Contracts and the Doctrine of Corporate Opportunity, 5 U. ARK. LITrLE RocK L. REV. 39,
47 (1982).
121. REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.31 official comment at 230. For the full text of
§ 8.31, see supra note 118. Fairness, therefore, should be determined at the time of the
transaction, not at the time of the challenge. In addition, courts should take into account all
facts and circumstances.
122. For example, even if the price was fair, a disinterested board surely would con-
sider whether the corporation needed the commodity in question. See, e.g., Fill Bldgs., Inc.
v. Alexander Hamilton Life, 396 Mich. 453, 461, 241 N.W.2d 466, 469 (1976) (concluding
that there was no legitimate reason why a corporation would buy something it did not
need). Thus, even if the price for a particular good was reasonable, the transaction would
not be in the corporation's best interests if the corporation did not need that particular
good. Cf. Webber, supra note 120, at 47. Professor Webber argues that a transaction may
be fair under the arm's length bargain test, yet still not be in the corporation's best
interests.
123. There is definitely the appearance of impropriety if a director's interest is not
disclosed. The issue, however, is whether nondisclosure makes the transaction "unfair." Pro-
fessor Webber argues that full disclosure of the director's interest and full disclosure of all
relevant facts that might affect a board's judgment should have a bearing on fairness. Web-
ber, supra note 120, at 48. But cf. Harris Trust, 53 Ill. App. 3d at 554, 368 N.E.2d at 638
(stating that "[i]n our view ... [the fairness test] is meant to be effective ... when the
agreement is known, but the director's interest is not disclosed"); American Timber & Trad-
ing Co. v. Niedermeyer, 276 Or. 1135, 1146, 558 P.2d 1211, 1218-19 (1976) (holding that the
Oregon statute, which is identical to Model Act § 41, allowed the enforcement of contracts
even if the contracts had "not been approved by a disinterested board or ratified by the
shareholders").
124. Requiring full disclosure to the board before it approves the transaction is the
substantial equivalent of requiring that the first "prong" of § 8.31(a) be met. See REVISED
MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.31(a); supra note 103.
125. Compare the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance,
which would strike down a transaction omitting disclosure of a director's interest and the
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3. Burden of Proving Fairness
Neither section 8.31 nor the official comments address the is-
sue of which party must carry the burden of proving the fairness of
a transaction. Nevertheless, the burden of proof is of critical im-
portance l s because courts have had difficulty evaluating "fair-
ness ' 127 and because this fairness evaluation often is outcome de-
terminative.12 8 It appears certain that courts will place the burden
of proof on the interested director in cases in which the director's
interest was not fully disclosed to the board or shareholders prior
to ratification. Courts have interpreted the state statutes patterned
after Model Act section 41129 in this manner. 1s0 Revised Model Act
section 8.31 does not require courts to change this interpretation.
A more difficult question arises, however, if a disinterested
board or the shareholders have ratified, approved, or authorized
material facts concerning that interest even if the transaction was "fair" to the corporation
with REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.31. See generally infra ALI Proposals (Special Pro-
ject) notes 164-72.
126. See Bulbulia & Pinto, Statutory Responses to Interested Directors' Transac-
tions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards, 53 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 201, 225-26 (1977)
(noting that "[b]ecause of the conceptual problems posed by the fairness test, the burden of
proof is of critical importance").
127. See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
129. Similar to Revised Model Act § 8.31, Model Act § 41 also does not discuss the
burden of proof. Section 41 provides:
No contract or other transaction between a corporation and one or more of its directors
or any other corporation, firm, association or entity in which one or more of its direc-
tors are directors or officers or are financially interested, shall be either void or voidable
because of such relationship or interest or because such director or directors are pre-
sent at the meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof which authorizes,
approves or ratifies such contract or transaction or because his or their votes are
counted for such purpose, if:
(a) the fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known to the board of
directors or committee which authorizes, approves or ratifies the contract or transac-
tion by a vote or consent sufficient for the purpose without counting the votes or con-
sents of such interested directors; or
(b) the fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known to the sharehold-
ers entitled to vote and they authorize, approve or ratify such contract or transaction
by vote or written consent; or
(c) the contract or transaction is fair and reasonable to the corporation.
Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the presence of a
quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof which authorizes,
approves or ratifies such contact or transaction.
MBCA, supra note 7, § 41.
130. See, e.g., Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnston, 498 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1974) (hold-
ing that, under an Ohio statute similar to Model Act § 41, the burden of proof is on the
interested director if there was not full disclosure).
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the transaction after a full disclosure of the director's interest.13 1
Some courts still place the burden on the interested director,'32
while others shift the burden to the party attacking the transac-
tion. 3 Courts interpreting the Revised Model Act should reach
the latter result and shift the burden. If the interested director still
bears the burden of proof, the first two prongs of section 8.31's
"or" test would be complete surplusage. 3 4 It is unlikely that the
drafters of the Revised Model Act intended the statute to be read
in this manner. In addition, the Revised Model Act's Exposure
Draft specifically shifted the burden of proof to the party attacking
the transaction if full disclosure was made to the board or share-
holders and the transaction was thereafter authorized, approved,
or ratified.3 5 The drafters of the Exposure Draft changed the lan-
guage of Model Act section 41 to reflect more accurately present
judicial interpretations of section 41.36 Revised Model Act section
8.31 does not attempt to change these interpretations of Model Act
section 41.
B. Determining Who is an "Interested" Director
Section 8.31 clearly applies if a director has a direct, material
financial interest in any of the corporation's transactions. 137 How-
ever, it also applies if a director has an "indirect interest" in a
transaction.'3 8 Therefore, section 8.31 applies to a transaction in
131. See Webber, supra note 120, at 53.
132. See, e.g., Mueller v. MacBan, 62 Cal. App. 3d 258, 277, 132 Cal. Rptr. 222, 232
(1976) (placing the burden on the defendant-director to prove the fairness of the transaction
even in situations in which the shareholders approved the transaction).
133. See, e.g., Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 1979) (shifting the burden of
proof back to the party challenging the transaction if, after full disclosure, the transaction
was approved by a disinterested vote of the board or by the shareholders).
134. The first two prongs of § 8.31 will be rendered surplusage if a court refuses to
give effect to these two prongs to validate a transaction for conflict of interest purposes, see
supra notes 109-16, or to shift the burden of proof. Therefore, § 8.31(a)(1)-(2) would play no
role in conflict of interest situations.
135. REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.31 (Exposure Draft 1983). For the full text of
the Exposure Draft, see supra note 111.
136. See RE.VSED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.31 official comment 4 (Exposure Draft
1983).
137. See REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.31(a).
138. Id. Section 8.31(b) defines "indirect interest" for purposes of § 8.31(a) as follows:
(1) Another entity in which he has a material financial interest or in which he is a
general partner is a party to the transaction, or
(2) Another entity of which he is a director, officer or trustee is a party to the
transaction and the transaction is or should be considered by the board of directors of
the corporation.
Id. § 8.31(b).
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which the corporations involved have common directors3 9 if the
transaction is of such importance to either corporation that its
board should approve the transaction, even if the common direc-
tors do not have a material financial interest in the transaction. 14 0
Section 8.31(b)(2), however, permits "normal" business activities
between corporations with common directors.
141
C. Ratification, Approval, or Authorization by
the Board or Shareholders
Section 8.31(c)-(d), which addresses board and shareholder
approval of conflict of interest transactions, is an elaboration on
and clarification of the concepts contained in Model Act section
41.142 The requirements for approval of conflict of interest transac-
tions are more strenuous than normal voting requirements. 14 In
section 8.31(c) a conflict of interest transaction is approved, au-
thorized, or ratified for purposes of section 8.31(a)(1) if a majority
of disinterested144 directors of the corporation vote in favor of the
transaction. 45 A quorum for such a vote also is defined as a major-
ity of the disinterested directors; however, at least two directors
must be eligible to vote.141
Section 8.31(d), which governs shareholder approval, is similar
to section 8.31(c). A majority of the shares "entitled to vote" is
needed both for a quorum and for approval of the transaction.1 4
Shares that are not entitled to vote include those shares "owned or
139. Id. § 8.31 official comment at 230.
140. Id.
141. Id. § 8.31(b)(2).
142. 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT. ANN. § 8.31 annotation at 966 (3d ed. Supp. 1986).
Compare REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.31(c)-(d) (reprinted supra note 103) with
MBCA, supra note 7, § 41 (reprinted supra note 129).
143. See REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.31 official comment at 230. Compare RE-
VISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.31(c)-(d) with REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.24 (voting
and quorum requirements for directors) and REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, §§ 7.25-7.27
(voting and quorum requirements for shareholders).
144. The Revised Model Act does not define "disinterested director" for purposes of
§ 8.31(c)-(d). The official. comment, however, states that a director normally should be con-
sidered "interested" if the director or immediate members of the director's family "have a
financial interest in the transaction or a relationship with the other parties to the transac-
tion such that the relationship might reasonably be expected to affect his judgment in the
particular matter in a manner adverse to the corporation." REVISED MBCA, supra note 4,
§ 8.31 official comment at 231.
145. Id. § 8.31(c). A committee of the board of directors also may approve a transac-
tion. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. § 8.31(d).
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voted under the control of a director who has a direct or indirect
interest in the transaction, and shares owned by or voted under the
control of an entity described in [section 8.31 (a)(1)]. '"'4 All unen-
titled shares, however, are permitted to vote to determine if the
transaction is approved under other provisions of the Revised
Model Act.14 9
D. Loans to Directors
Revised Model Act section 8.32 addresses a specific type of
conflict of interest transaction: loans to directors by the corpora-
tion. 5 ' Section 8.32 declares that these transactions are forbid-
den;' 5 ' however, it also lists two exceptions to this general rule.
Loans may be made to a director if: (1) the loan is approved by a
majority of the outstanding shares of the corporation, except those
shares held by or controlled by the benefitted director; 5 2 or (2) the
board determines that the loan benefits the corporation and, con-
sequently, approves the loan or a general plan authorizing loans. 153
Revised Model Act section 8.32 deviates from the Model Act in
two ways. First, section 8.32(c) specifically excludes those loans
148. Id.
149. Id. The official comment gives as an example a situation in which a parent corpo-
ration merges with its 60% owned subsidiary and the majority shareholder in the parent is a
director of the subsidiary. The director's shares should be counted to determine whether the
corporation approved the merger under chapter 11 of the Revised Model Act. The director's
shares, however, should not be counted to determine the conflict of interest issue because
the shares are owned by an entity that the director controls and that is a party to the
transaction. Instead, the parent must rely on the "fairness" test of § 8.31(a)(3) to approve
the conflict of interest transaction. Id. official comment at 229-30.
150. See id. § 8.32. This section also applies to guarantees of directors' obligations by
the corporation. Section 8.32 provides as follows:
(a) Except as provided by subsection (c), a corporation may not lend money to or
guarantee the obligation of a director of the corporation unless:
(1) the particular loan or guarantee is approved by a majority of the votes
represented by the outstanding voting shares of all classes, voting as a single vot-
ing group, except the votes of shares owned by or voted under the control of the
benefited director; or
(2) the corporation's board of directors determines that the loan or guarantee
benefits the corporation and either approves the specific loan or guarantee or a
general plan authorizing loans and guarantees.
(b) The fact that a loan or guarantee is made in violation of this section does not
affect the borrower's liability on the loan.
(c) This section does not apply to loans and guarantees authorized by statute regu-
lating any special class of corporation.
Id.
151. Id. § 8.32(a).
152. Id. § 8.32(a)(1).
153. Id. § 8.32(a)(2).
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"authorized by statute regulating any special class of corporations"
from its definition of "prohibited loans. 1' 54 Second, section 8.32(b)
provides that any loan made in violation of section 8.32 will not
affect the director's liability for the loan.1
55
By permitting the board of directors to approve loans to board
members, section 8.32(a)(2) reflects the Committee's belief that the
potential for abuse is minimal, or at least is counterbalanced by
the potential benefits. In fact, section 8.32 allows the benefitted
director to participate in the vote.'15  One commentator has sug-
gested that section 8.32 should be eliminated, or at least re-written
to (1) exclude the benefitted director from the vote, or (2) allow
the corporation's shareholders to decide in the articles of incorpo-
ration or the by-laws whether to grant the board the power to ap-
prove loans to directors.1 57 This commentator argues that the mod-
ern day board of directors lacks the "independence and
objectivity" to vote in good faith on corporate loans to a
colleague. 158
V. CONCLUSION
This Special Project Note is intended as a primer for analysis
of the duty of care and the duty of loyalty under the Revised
Model Act. The Revised Model Act's treatment of the duty of care
is no different than the Model Act's treatment; therefore, the Re-
154. Id. § 8.32(c). The official comment explains that because statutes regulating loans
by banks, savings and loans, and other financial institutions provide sufficient protection for
the shareholders, the protections of § 8.32 are unnecessary. Id. official comment at 232.
155. Id. § 8.32(b). This provision protects the shareholders from possible loss on the
loan. See Elfin, A Critique of Portions of the 1983 Revised Model Business Corporation
Act, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 865, 872 (1984). Compare REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.32 with
MBCA, supra note 7, § 47, which provides:
A corporation shall not lend money to or use its credit to assist its directors without
authorization in the particular case by its shareholders, but may lend money to and use
credit to assist any employee of the corporation or of a subsidiary, including any such
employee who is a director of the corporation, if the board of directors decides that
such loan or assistance may benefit the corporation.
MBCA, supra note 7, § 47.
156. REVISED MBCA, supra note 4, § 8.32(a)(2). Section 8.32(a)(2) makes no provision
for the exclusion of the benefitted director. Loans to directors still might be struck down,
however, if the loans were not made pursuant to § 8.32(a)(2) because the loan could not
possibly "benefit" the corporation. See Oberhelman v. Barnes Inv. Corp., 236 Kan. 335, 690
P.2d 1343 (1984).
157. See Elfin, supra note 155, at 873-76.
158. Id. at 874. Professor Elfin lists New York and North Carolina as two states with
statutes that are consistent with his reasoning. See N.Y. BUSINESS CORP. LAW § 714 (McKin-
ney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-22 (1982).
1987]
692 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:663
vised Model Act should have little, if any, impact on this area of
the law. In fact, the Model Act itself was essentially a restatement
of the common-law approach existing at the time of the Model
Act's adoption. Likewise, the duty of loyalty under the Revised
Model Act and the Model Act, although radically different from
the common-law duty on their face, will not affect courts' contin-
ued application of the common-law approach. Thus, the Revised
Model Act will not materially alter the common law surrounding
directors' and officers' duties of care and loyalty.
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